{"ID":63880,"name":"Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee","href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/cases\/2025\/25-498","view_count":0,"docket_number":"25-498 ","additional_docket_numbers":null,"manner_of_jurisdiction":"Writ of \u003Ci\u003Ecertiorari\u003C\/i\u003E","first_party":"Winston R. Anderson","second_party":"Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee","timeline":[{"event":"Granted","dates":[1768543200],"href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/case_timeline\/case_timeline\/55777"}],"lower_court":{"ID":5,"name":"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit","href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/taxonomy\/term\/5"},"facts_of_the_case":"\u003Cp\u003EFrom 2000 to 2015, Winston R. Anderson was a participant in two Intel Corporation retirement plans: the Intel 401(k) Savings Plan and the Intel Retirement Contribution Plan. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Intel changed the structure of its proprietary investment funds\u2014used within these plans\u2014to include allocations to hedge funds and private equity, in addition to traditional assets like stocks and bonds. According to Intel, this strategy aimed to reduce volatility and protect against downturns, though it acknowledged the funds might underperform in bull markets. Anderson claims that these changes led to persistently poor returns due to allegedly excessive risk, high fees, and deviation from industry standards. He also alleges disloyalty by Intel fiduciaries, asserting they invested plan assets in ways that provided indirect benefits to Intel Capital, a venture capital arm of the company, rather than prioritizing participants\u0027 financial interests.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 2019, Anderson filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to represent a class of Intel retirement plan participants whose assets were invested in Intel\u2019s target-date or global diversified funds since 2009. His complaint alleged breaches of ERISA\u2019s duties of prudence and loyalty. After multiple amended pleadings and dismissals, the district court held that Anderson failed to identify any \u201cmeaningful benchmark\u201d against which to measure the imprudence of the Intel funds\u2019 strategy and failed to plausibly allege a conflict of interest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Anderson\u2019s underperformance theory and emphasizing that ERISA requires pleading a plausible inference of flawed investment process\u2014not merely suboptimal results\u2014and, where appropriate, comparison to suitably similar investment alternatives.\u003C\/p\u003E\n","question":"\u003Cp\u003EMust a complaint alleging a fiduciary breach in ERISA underperformance cases include allegations of a \u201cmeaningful benchmark\u201d to survive the pleading stage?\u003C\/p\u003E\n","conclusion":null,"advocates":null,"oral_argument_audio":null,"citation":{"volume":null,"page":null,"year":null,"href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/case_citation\/case_citation\/28140"},"decisions":null,"first_party_label":"Petitioner","second_party_label":"Respondent","heard_by":[null],"decided_by":null,"term":"2025","location":null,"opinion_announcement":null,"description":"A case in which the Court will decide whether a complaint alleging a fiduciary breach in ERISA underperformance cases must include allegations of a \u201cmeaningful benchmark\u201d to survive the pleading stage.","written_opinion":null,"related_cases":null,"justia_url":"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/2025\/25-498 \/","argument2_url":null}