{"ID":63889,"name":"Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney\u0027s Office, Georgia","href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/cases\/2026\/25-352","view_count":0,"docket_number":"25-352","additional_docket_numbers":null,"manner_of_jurisdiction":"Writ of \u003Ci\u003Ecertiorari\u003C\/i\u003E","first_party":"Jasmine Younge","second_party":"Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney\u0027s Office, Georgia ","timeline":[{"event":"Granted","dates":[1774846800],"href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/case_timeline\/case_timeline\/55807"}],"lower_court":{"ID":15,"name":"United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit","href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/taxonomy\/term\/15"},"facts_of_the_case":"\u003Cp\u003EIn April 2019, Fulton County District Attorney Paul Howard \u2014 an elected official \u2014 hired Dr. Jasmine Younge as Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy and Programs at a salary of $120,282. Younge ranked third in the office\u0027s chain of command, reported exclusively to Howard, supervised more than thirty employees, and worked so closely with Howard that he described her as a \u0022key member\u0022 and his \u0022go-to person for almost everything.\u0022 About two months into her tenure, Younge told Howard she was pregnant.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter that announcement, Howard stopped meeting with Younge, excluded her from meetings, treated her dismissively, and reassigned some of her duties \u2014 then fired her two weeks later. Younge sued the Fulton County District Attorney\u0027s Office for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. In its answer, the DA\u0027s Office raised several affirmative defenses but did not plead the Title VII personal-staff exemption \u2014 which excludes from Title VII\u0027s coverage persons chosen to serve on an elected official\u0027s \u0022personal staff.\u0022 The DA\u0027s Office did not recognize the exemption as relevant until it began preparing its summary judgment motion, after discovery had already closed.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003Cp\u003EThe district court allowed the DA\u0027s Office to raise the personal-staff exemption for the first time at summary judgment, finding no prejudice to Younge from the late assertion, and granted summary judgment to the DA\u0027s Office on that basis; Younge then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed.\u003C\/p\u003E\n","question":"\u003Cp\u003EMay a defendant raise an affirmative defense it never pleaded in its answer as the sole basis for a summary judgment motion \u2014 without seeking to amend its answer \u2014 and does it matter that the court\u0027s scheduling order deadline would have barred any such amendment?\u003C\/p\u003E\n","conclusion":null,"advocates":null,"oral_argument_audio":null,"citation":{"volume":null,"page":null,"year":null,"href":"https:\/\/api.oyez.org\/case_citation\/case_citation\/28145"},"decisions":null,"first_party_label":"Petitioner","second_party_label":"Respondent","heard_by":[null],"decided_by":null,"term":"2026","location":null,"opinion_announcement":null,"description":"A case in which the Court will decide whether a defendant who files an answer without including an affirmative defense may still raise that defense as the basis for a summary judgment motion \u2014 without ever amending its answer \u2014 and whether that remains true even when the deadline to seek such an amendment has already passed under the scheduling order.","written_opinion":null,"related_cases":null,"justia_url":"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/2026\/25-352\/","argument2_url":null}